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Abstract
There are few elements of public policy as im portant, or as deeply personal, as food
policy. Government intervention in agriculture has been an expected norm in the
United States since the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, but how has their
action affected the individual rights of the consumer? This thesis aims to address the
effects of eighty years of policy through direct impacts of legislation in the areas of
biofuels, genetically modified foods, and corporate welfare.
The agricultural industrial machine has made the United States one of the world's
top exporters for food, but at the cost of competition in the marketplace and
personal freedom. Implications of US policy are both domestic and global, in today's
world and pending in the future.
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I. I n t r o d u c t i o n : A g r i c u l t u r e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
The two things all Americans, and really any citizen of humanity, have facing
them as a constant need, regardless of socioeconomic, cultural, or governmental
influence is the need for food and water. Living in the United States comes with a
litany of benefits, from a long line of independent-m inded rebels not willing to settle
for the standard, but always striving for a little more. These benefits include access
to food. For m ost people in the country, save the very bottom percentages on the
wealth scale, basic caloric intake isn't really ever out of reach. We are fortunate to
have historically very low percentages of total income spent on food, especially
when compared to the staggering amounts the world's poor spend on food out of
their entire household income; access is further bolstered by federal, state, and
private program s to aid those people th at need the m ost in our society.
Food is cheap, tastes good, and comes in such large quantities it can actually
be a little frightening to visitors. This is where the first question comes into play: can
a system th at provides so much, for such relatively little cost, have negative
consequences? The obesity epidemic is a potential indicator of a problem. I've
always been the first person to say th at personal choice, not governm ent decision
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making, should dictate the way people live their lives. Obesity can be a great chunk
attributed to the personal choices of people.
However, the governm ent has dictated major agricultural policy and directed
the way the food industry is to grow, w hat they can grow, how they can grow it, and
who can grow it, and how much it will cost. W hat started out as emergency policy
during the Great Depression has evolved into an essentially government-controlled
food market, with many players, motives, and outcomes- all seeming to focus solely
on the short-term benefits. The greatest irony of the potential for problems in the
food industry is th at no one can truly escape the effects, especially future
generations.
Corn is the prim ary crop driving the US economy, the natural landscape of
the Midwest and p art of the heart of this nation in image and lifestyle. Through corn
derived additives, feed-grain, and fuel, there is little in the food industry th at corn
doesn't impact. Given th at only a small percentage of corn in the US is nongenetically modified/engineered, there is also a potential major problem of
biodiversity and the potential for unknown long-term effects of modified food
products th at could invite of host of problems to the economy and health of the
country.
It's clear the governm ent presently has far reaching effects on food policy,
raising an im portant question-- In a heavily subsidized and regulated food industry;
does this role of governm ent improve the product on the shelf and on the table of
5

Americans and as well as those abroad? Or has the food industry turned into
pleasing political donors th at reinforce with the status-quo instead of reflecting
m arket-based, consum er-oriented solutions?
This thesis aims to uncover the government's direct role, historically and
currently, in the food industry. Instead of a governm ent th at is supposed to be by
the people and for the people, has a series of special interests turned w hat should be
the m ost basic and fundamental choice of every person into decisions by an elite,
above the people, for the highest bidder?
While I w on't advocate throw ing away a safety-net for the agricultural
industry, for food is a major player in the web of security issues, I believe the
current system of US policy is and has been failing the US consumer, free enterprise,
and global ecology. The evolution of US policy, especially the farm bill, has been one
from emergency, to welfare, to pork-barreling, to political suicide for those who
speak against the allegedly “natural” m arket evolution. In this new state of
emergency, our ever-present debt crisis and fallacies of solutions produced by
lawmakers, it's time to take a step back and evaluate the causes, conditions, and
effects of these questions, and assess the puzzle of the current food industry.
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II. G o v e r n m e n t I n t e r v e n t i o n : L e g i s l a t i v e H i s t o r y
Government Influence: 1 789-19161
The U.S. Constitution became the suprem e law of the land in 1789, w ithout
enum erated powers involving the agricultural sector2. The US government's
involvement in farming began with the creation of an agricultural committee in the
House of Representatives and Senate, in 1820 and 1825, respectively. Abraham
Lincoln established the US D epartm ent of Agriculture (USDA) in 1862, referring to it
as the “people's departm ent”. From 18 62-19 14, various other bolstering of the
Federal government's role in agriculture, especially research expanded the breadth
of the USDA's capabilities.
From 19 1 6 to 1930, there was a fairly substantial growth of intervention in
the agricultural sector. These were the first attem pts to directly regulate the
functioning of the netw ork of farmers. 1 9 1 6 presented the creation of the Federal
Farm Loan Act, which created “cooperative ‘land banks'”3, the precursor to the Farm
Credit System. It was a way to provide loans and assistance to farmers.

1 Edwards, Chris. "Department o f Agriculture." Downsizing the Federal Government. Cato
Institute. < http://www .downsizinggovernment.org/agriculture> .
2 Edwards
3 Edwards
7

The 1 9 2 9 Federal Reserve System decision to decrease the U.S. money supply
by one-third over the following four years deeply affected prices of commodity
crops. The prices for staple crops dropped significantly, causing many farm ers to be
in extremely perilous situations. While sales plummeted, interests on mortgages and
property taxes rem ained high, causing many to be on the verge of losing their land.
With the economy in depression, and calls for protection of US markets
including farming, growing, President Hoover agreed to the Smoot-Hawley Act in
1 9 3 0 4. This act increased tariffs for farm and industrial goods. Much of the
international community responded with similar tariffs, causing exports to fall 60%
by 1 9 3 3 5.

Great Depression and the AAA
The Great Depression wrought the first true test run of Keynesian economics
in the United States. The clamoring for something, anything be done was heard loud
and clear by Roosevelt. True to its theory of deficit spending, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt p ut forth a slew of government-induced demand. One of the largest
monetarily, and in-purpose programs, was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933

4 Edwards
5 Edwards
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(AAA). Considered to be a “cornerstone”6 in the New Deal, the prim ary goal was to
enact a “centralized food policy”7.
At the time, twenty-five percent of Americans were living on farm s8. External
factors, i.e. extensive droughts and the global depression of food prices, created a
situation where one quarter of the U.S. population was in one of the m ost volatile
areas of the market, a staggering realization th at led to staggering demand for
action. The 1933 Act declared a national state of emergency in the farming industry,
which was also crippling the ability to garner typical capital necessary for farm
m anagem ent throughout the system. Commodity crops were especially hard hit. A
commodity crop in its m ost basic definition is a crop th at is traded9. Generally, these
crops are nonperishable and able to be stored and/or transported. Commodity
crops in the context of US food policy are the ones directly regulated by the federal
governm ent10
The difference betw een the farm industry and any other industry being
exposed to the business cycle is the basic human need, regardless of preference or
socioeconomic class, to have sustenance. The AAA attem pted to “stabilize the

6 Kwan, Charlene C. "Fixing the Farm Bill: Using the "Permanent Provisions" In
Agricultural Law to Achieve WTO Compliance." Environmental Affairs 36
(2009): 571-606. Print.
7 Kwan 575
8 Kwan 575
9 Braun, Lois. "What Are Commodity Crops and W hy Do They Matter?" Hampden Park Co-op.
03 Apr. 2012. Web.
10 Braun
9

agricultural sector”11 in two facets: price and production. The 73rd Congress wanted
to make up for the inability of farmers to purchase/pay for their “extraordinary
expenses,”12 like machinery and labor costs.
The 1933 Act was explicitly built with language th at ensured no m easure in
the act could be carried forth if it violated current Anti-Trust Laws13. This measure
was in place to ensure that the small farms this act intended to protect w eren't
wiped out by the subsidy structure or potential conglomerates eager to buy up
defaulted land.
Outlined in p art two of the Act, under General Powers, the appointed
Secretary of Agriculture quickly became one of the m ost powerful leaders in the
United States. The general overtures of the Secretary's powers were outlined in
three main points. First, reduction of current commodity production, through
“rental benefit paym ents”14, essentially the governm ent renting out the land to
ensure crops are not grown and the physical storing of those crops th at were
deemed non-perishable15. It boils down to paying farmers not to farm their land to
control production levels. Secondly, the Secretary was to manage the agreem ents
with individual farmers, again reiterating that antitrust laws could not be broken
11 Kwan 575
12 United States. Cong. House o f Represenatives. 73rd Congress, 1st Session. H.R. 3835
Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10. 48 Stat. 31. The National
Agricultural Law Center: United States Farm Bills. Web. Accessed August 2012.
<http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
13 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
14 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
15 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
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and that these agreem ents would be nullified once the act had passed its time limit.
Lastly, the Secretary was also responsible for issuing and revoking licenses when
appropriate16.
Loan rates were determ ined by the Secretary of Agriculture, “in light of
current supplies and anticipated dem and”17. Crops such as corn, wheat, and cotton
were under m andatory loans, in the believing that the only way to stabilize across
the system in this emergency state was to ensure everyone was under the same
price structure for the most im portant crops, but provisions allowed for other crops
to be included as seen fit18.
A 1933 executive order established the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC)19. The Delaware based corporation's purpose was to provide emergency loans
in cases where there was a substantial chance the farm er might put their crops on
“already flooded m arkets”20. This allowed the governm ent to control m arket supply
directly. Virgil W. Dean of the CCC argued th at the nonrecourse loans the CCC
provided allowed for the m arket to still have stable prices when they began to fall to
low levels21.
The CCC originally was conceived to be a tem porary governm ent entity, to
dissolve when the aggregate domestic economy was in a more stable position. Not
16 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
17 Kwan 577
18 Kwan 577
19 Kwan 577
20 Kwan 576
21 Kwan 577
11

surprisingly, as with m ost governm ent programs, the CCC quickly became a
perm anent bureaucratic entity, far surpassing its initial sixteen m onth charter22.
Nonrecourse loans allowed the farmers to use their commodities as
collateral, w herein the farm er could chose to reclaim the crop if the price increased
to profitable levels, or to not reclaim. Not reclaiming the crop allowed the
governm ent to keep the commodity crop and be considered in full paym ent of the
loan23. Between 19 3 5 and 1936, farm income had risen dramatically, approximately
fifty percent24, seen as a direct accomplishment of the Roosevelt Administration.
As with all governm ent programs, there needed to be a provision on how
this would be paid for. The result was a “processing tax”25 on those commodities
outlined as ones th at would be a p art of this subsidy structure. The tax would be
collected during the “first domestic processing and paid by the processor”26, at a
rate determ ined by the difference between the m arket value farm price and the “fair
exchange value”. The “Fair exchange value” gave the commodity in question the
same value as it would have been on the m arket betw een 1909 and 1914, the
“prew ar” period, excluding tobacco, which would be valued in the post-W orld War I
period27.

22 Kwan 577
23 Kwan 577
24 Kwan 577
25 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
26 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
27 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
12

“Processing” for wheat, rice, and corn entailed milling or any other post
harvesting m easures to get the product ready for the m arket28. However, processing
tax excluded cleaning and drying, along with any commodity that was to be changed
into a product for feeding livestock. The processing tax figures were to be made
public by the Secretary of Agriculture. There would be no tax on the processing of
crops deemed for export.
Section 11 of the Act defines w hat crops will be counted as “commodities”.
These prim ary staple crops included: wheat, cotton, field corn, hogs, rice, tobacco,
and milk (including by-products like milk and cheese29). Section 12 was where the
money num bers started to pour out. The Secretary of Agriculture was to have
$ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 30 th at he would be able to use “until spent”31. This section also left
open for possibility more money if it was used for the “expansion of m arkets and
removal of surplus agricultural products and various adm inistrative costs”. Adjusted
for inflation, the base rate available to be spent today, at the discretion of the
Secretary, would equal U S $175,000,390,667 (2 0 1 2 dollar value)32. The money made
available was significant because this was considered and treated as a national
emergency.

28 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10.
29 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10.
30 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10.
31 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10.
32 "The Inflation Calculator." The Inflation Calculator. Web.
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48
48
48
48

Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.

31.
31.
31.
31.

The Act had w ritten in that it was to be term inated when the crisis was
considered to be over. Roosevelt in his executive, power-wielding wisdom said that
it was up to him, as the head of state, to determ ine when the crisis was considered
“over”. One of the last pieces of the AAA, under “Miscellaneous” states th at the
“Authority of the president is unrestricted as long as salaries of personnel stay
under $10,000 per year”33.
$ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 34 additional US dollars would be made available to the Farm Loan
Commissioner. These loans were to be used for the “reduction of debts and
redem ption of foreclosed farm s”35. In today's dollar figures, this would be a fund
w orth U S$3,508,771,929.82.

1 93 6 Supreme Court of the United States: United States v Butler36
The ability of the Secretary of Agriculture to determ ine contracts, the
nonrecourse loans, giving farmers direct paym ent for not producing and not placing
crops on the m arket had to be paid for in some form. The money came from a
congressional act th at imposed a tax on domestic processing of certain commodities.
The first person to process the product would be responsible for paying the tax,
with exemptions for crops to be exported- another step to try and bolster the
economy. The tax was deemed to be outside of the federal government's scope, and

33 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
34 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
35 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1933. Pub. L. N o.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
36 United States v. Butler. 297 U.S. 1. Supreme Court of the US. 1936. Legal Information
Institute, Cornell University Law School. Web. September 2012.
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in direct violation of the 10th amendment, breaching state's rights by way of the
ever-popular commerce clause.

193 8 Agricultural Adjustment Act: Revision & Extension
The described purpose of the post-Butler farm legislation was to regulate and
manage conservation efforts and land use to create a “balanced flow” of commodity
products betw een states and through exports. The 1 9 3 8 Act at first seems to be
prim arily focused on conservation and ensuring healthy soil to continue good
growth rates for the marketplace, but quickly starts throw ing out significant dollar
am ounts to various crops and government agencies making it clear that the
“national emergency” w asn't over by the President's standards. A safeguard was put
in place ensuring that the act as a whole would still remain effective, regardless if
one elem ent was deemed unconstitutional and/or illegal per the courts37.
Acreage allotments became much more specific, in regulation and by crop.
Corn had quite a few more standards placed on it, including the “tillable acreage,
type of soil, topography, and crop rotation practices”. Section 102 outlined the way
payments were to be m ade38. Still in the age of sharecropping, payments had to be

37 United States. Cong. House o f Representatives. 75th Congress, 3rd Session. H.R. 8505
Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31. The National
Agricultural Law Center: United States Farm Bills. Web. Accessed August 2012.
<http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
38 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
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made proportionally to “owners, tenants, and sharecroppers”39. No total farm
paym ent could exceed $10,000 in one year40.
In yet another expansion of the Secretary of Agriculture's power, he was now
“authorized to make complaints to the Interstate Commerce Commission”41 in
regards to rate changes for moving food throughout the market. There was now
federal control over production, production levels, prices, exports, and the cost of
moving product.
The 1 9 3 8 AAA gifted to the American society the first major perm anent
provision of farm legislation. The act was substantial, covering a vast am ount of food
related issues including, but not limited to: m andatory loans, paym ent of benefits,
production control, crop insurance, and soil conservation”42. Marketing quotas were
now permissible when established the price support programs. Price support
program s are a basic crutch of the food industry for years th at supply isn't as high as
the government an d /o r current demand would like it to be. Import duties and tariffs
are in place until a set production demand is met. Producers get to sell for a higher
price, w ithout international competition43. The m arketing quotas created a “more
stringent means of controlling output”44, established by the Secretary of Agriculture.

39 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
40 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
41 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
42 Kwan 578
43 Edwards
44 Kwan 578
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Corn, defined as “field corn”45, would have loans made available when the
year's crop yield was more than w hat was predicted, based on the previous year's
figures. This would also occur if the price of corn fell below 75 percent of the parity
price of th at year46.
The 1 9 3 8 Act also explicitly put in place consumer protection elements. The
prim ary focus of these safeguards was to ensure production would m eet the
demand of normal consumption, keeping with “consumer dem ands”47. Also, all
acreage allotments and m arketing quotas were to be made available to the public by
the Secretary of Agriculture48.
1 9 3 8 ensured also th at the CCC49 would be around at least for another five
years. Congressional m embers began to favor the CCC as a perm anent entity, not
just one for emergency situations as originally envisioned50. The act also allowed the
Secretary of Agriculture to not only set CCC rates, but from 1 9 3 8 -1 9 4 0 to set various
other commodities such as butter, figs, barley, wool, peanuts, and tobacco51.
Title V of the bill focused on crop insurance52. The idea behind the crop
insurance was to “maintain farmers' purchasing pow er” and ensure “national
welfare” by preventing disasters in commodity crop, especially w heat and corn
45 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub.
46 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub.
47 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub.
48 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub.
49 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub.
50 Kwan 578-579
51 Kwan 579
52 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub.
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L.
L.
L.
L.
L.

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

75-430,
75-430,
75-430,
75-430,
75-430,

52
52
52
52
52

Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.

31.
31.
31.
31.
31.

L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.

crops. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation was created. This corporation would
have U S$100,000,000 in “capital stock”53, with an oversight board hand-picked by
the Secretary of Agriculture. As an added bonus, the FCIC was tax-exempt. The crop
insurance program was present, but mostly experimental until 1 9 8 5 54

1948 and 1949 Agricultural Acts
Although the 1 9 4 8 55 and 19 49 acts were essentially the same, the 1949 bill
enacted yet another provision to affect any and all forthcoming legislation. They
were built on the established theory th at high fixed price-supports56 were the best
way to stabilize the market, not only through the Great Depression, but moving into
the post-w ar years. Price supports, aiming for the 70-80 percent parity range,
became mandatory for commodity crops, optional for others57.
Price supports were now determ ined by a num ber of factors. Interestingly,
num ber eight was the “ability and willingness of producers to keep supply in line
with dem and”, yet another factor subject to the desires of the Secretary of
Agriculture.
With all the excess unclaimed crops in federal storage, the federal
government decided to put the crops to use in various other forms, as a means of
53 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment A ct o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
54 "History o f the Crop Insurance Program." History o f the Crop Insurance Program. USDA Risk
Management Agency.
55 United States. Senate. 80th Congress, 2nd Session. Pub. L. No. 80-897, 62 Stat. 1247. H.R. 5345
Agricultural A ct o f 1948. The National Agricultural Law Center: United States Farm
Bills. Web. Accessed August 2012. <http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
56 Kwan 579
57 Kwan 579
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preventing w aste58. The legislation dictated who had first pick. Access was granted
to these three groups (in order of first choice to last): (Category 1) School lunch
programs, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Federal, State, and local public welfare programs
for Indians and other needy person; (Category 2): Private welfare organizations for
the needy in the US; (Category 3): Private welfare for those organizations outside of
the US59.
The way parity was calculated also changed. The new calculations added the
10 years, 1 9 3 8-1 9 48 , to the years used for base calculations, 1 9 1 0 -1 9 1 4 60. Two
other items were also added into the process of creating a parity index: labor costs
and payments to commodity producers61. In effect, since commodity growers could
use this new formula when it was convenient62 for them, also known as a higher
profit, the parity prices w ent up greatly benefiting those producers.

1 97 0 Agricultural Act & Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act of 1973
Per usual, the prim ary purpose of any agricultural act was to extend the life
of the previous structure. For the 1970 Act, the 1 9 5 4 Act was extended, as had

58 United States. Cong. House o f Representatives. 81st Congress, 1st Session. Pub. L. No. 81-439,
63 Stat 1051. H.R. 5345 Agricultural A ct o f 1949. The National Agricultural Law Center:
United States Farm Bills. Web. Accessed August 2012.
<http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
59 United States. Cong. House o f Representatives. 81st Congress, 1st Session. Pub. L. No. 81-439,
63 Stat 1051.
60 Kwan 579-580
61 Kwan 580
62 Kwan 580
19

happened previously with the bill63. For the years 1971, 1972, and 1973 payments
per person were not to exceed US$55,000. Corn, as a feed grain was subject to parity
pricing (1 3 6 8 ), not to exceed the 9 0% threshold.
1973 was a volatile time in the world market, just after the first oil embargo,
the US stock m arket crash, and the Yom Kippur War. All of this together sparked a
renew ed interest in protecting commodities. Since there were food shortages
abroad and inflation had also hiked up the prices at grocery stores64, the pressure
was on to renew the system.
In steps Secretary of Agriculture Butz. He demolished the previously used
system “Ever-Normal Granary”, the mechanism to stabilize the grain market, opting
instead for a more stream lined agricultural system. The new emphasis was on
“fencerow to fencerow”65 crops and instead of controlling production levels, Butz
encouraged “maintaining or increasing output”66.
The major change to the price-support system was the elimination of the
parity index67. Instead, target prices and deficiency payments became the gold
standard. Congress would set the target prices, and if the m arket prices ended up
being under, farm ers would get a deficiency paym ent to make up for the price
63 United States. Cong. House o f Representatives. 91st. Congress, 2nd Session. Pub. L. No. 91-524,
84 Stat. 1358. H.R. 18546 Agricultural A ct o f 1970. The National Agricultural Law
Center: United States Farm Bills. Web. Accessed August 2012.
<http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
64 Kwan 580
65 Kwan 580
66 Kwan 580
67 Kwan 581
20

differences68. Low income households continued to be fed with excess commodities,
and disaster relief payments became commonplace after the 1973 bill.

Food Security Act of 1985
The prim ary focus of the 19 85 act was to “encourage exportation” of
commodity crops through the Export Enhancement Program69. The focus of the
program was especially exportation of corn, as feed grains70. This was to be
encouraged as much as possible, as long as it didn't plum m et the world prices. In
line with Butz, the food system was growing. Instead of simply adding more price
supports (although still in full swing), the idea was to export as much of the excess
as possible.
Before the passage of this bill, the Reagan Administration had introduced
ideas to substantially cut subsidization, but since farm finances w eren't in good
shape in the 1980s, it just w asn't politically feasible. Also passed was Conservation
Reserve Program 71, whose purpose was to pay farmers not to farm, for production
or soil preservation reasons.

1990: The 11 Part Act72.
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The dramatic increase in money floating around and the influence of
governm ent in the agricultural sector is evident simply in how long the bills
gradually became. In p art three of the 199 0 bill, the focus was squarely on produce.
Section 1303 commissioned a study to evaluate the “state of domestic fruits and
vegetables”73. It specifically w anted to look into the “scientific and technological
advances” in regards to genetically modified foods, biotechnology, and pesticides.
Labeling policies were central to the debate. The m ost crucial elem ent of
labeling was regulation of organic food. The “National Organic Production
Program ”74 outlined the program determ ining products qualifying organic foods for
labeling. There would be federal standards, but each state had the right to create
their own program for additional certification. The National Organic Standards
Board would be the final word, appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture.
The standards for organic food were composed of three factors: no synthetic
chemicals, granted a few provisions, no synthetic chemicals used on the land three
years prior (excluding livestock), and th at the handling is in compliance with the
Board. These requirem ents would be in place starting October 1st, 1993.
The m ost incredible aspect of about the requirem ents was the exemption
section for processed food. With approval of the National Organic Standards Board

<http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
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and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the following was stated about
processed foods, and how they could be labeled organic75:
Exemptions FOR PROCESSED Food.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to agricultural
products that1. contain a t least 50 percent organically produced ingredients by weight,
excluding w ater and salt, to the extent that the Secretary, in consultation with
the National Organic Standards Board and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, has determined to perm it the word "organic" to be used on the
principal display panel of such products only fo r the purpose of describing the
organically produced ingredients; or
2.

(2 ) Contain less than 50 percent organically produced ingredients by weight,
excluding w ater and salt, to the extent that the Secretary, in consultation with
the National Organic Standards Board and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, has determined to perm it the word "organic" to appear on the
ingredient listing panel to describe those ingredients that are Organically
produced in accordance with this title.

A group completely exempt from organic food labeling is any small farms
th at produce less than $5,000 of agricultural products annually76. Therefore, in a

75 United States. Cong. Senate. 101st Congress, 2nd Session. Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359.
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welcomed turnaround for the processed food industry, there were great incentives
to hire the best lobbyists to ensure th at any processed food, as long as it was
accepted by the board and the Secretary, could be labeled organic. A win for the food
industry was a big loss for the consumer unaware of this legislation.

1996: Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR)77
Regulation p ut forth in 1 9 9 6 focused on letting farmers have greater
flexibility in production and maneuvering with m arket demands, referred to as the
“Freedom to Farm” law. This new version of subsidization was predicted to cost $47
billion dollars from FY1996-FY2 0 0 2 78. Quickly destroying the progress of realistic
and m arket-based commodity crops, Congress passed supplem ental farm bills every
year. The actual cost from 1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 2 was $12 1 billion dollars79. As a p art of this
process, target prices were eliminated deemed to grant the m ost flexibility to
farm ers80, due to the ability to decide w hat to be planted in a given growing season.
The farm population has been dwindling since the 1930s, but agriculture still
remains one of the m ost heavily subsidized areas of the entire US economy81. An

76 United States. Cong. Senate. 101st Congress, 2nd Session. Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359.
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easy push for legislators from farm states to swing urban-based legislators to be in
favor of farm bills is th at food stam ps are also included-- an im portant issue for
urban areas. Also, lobbying for the farm industry is incredibly strong, increasingly
able to push for higher USDA budgets.

2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act & 2 0 0 8 Food, Conservation, and
Energy Act
Farming won the political game again in 2002. The Bush Administration
offered some mild reform options, but was quickly shut down in Congress. President
Bush w ent so far to veto the 200 2 farm bill, but was overridden. The “counter
cyclical”82 price support system, the target-prices eliminated in the 19 96 bill, which
paid farm ers directly for the difference betw een the pegged “target price” and the
actual m arket value was im plem ented83. The program itself turned out to be
incredibly expensive and illogical. Farmers are still able to time the marking of a
target price at the peak of the year, and hold onto commodity crops (since they don't
perish) until m arket prices are lower, then flood the m arket to obtain the best
payout. The 2 0 0 2 Act also increased existing programs to cover even more crops.
Estimations at time of implem entation for the next ten years was a whopping 74%
increase in paym ents84

Food Conservation and Energy Act: 2008.
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2 0 0 8 legislation ended in the same m anger85. Amazingly, even more farm
subsidies w ere increased, and were implemented, despite another presidential veto.
The bill passed in June, when the financial center's downward spiral started to
become unavoidable, and the m arket was unstable. Essentially, it was perfect
m aelstrom for garnering support to protect the domestic food supply and major
exports, the clear repetition, and public desire of avoidance, repeating itself.
Although the US did go over the fiscal cliff for a day, and all of farming
America was up in arms about the possibility of not having a farm bill to thrive off
of, the American Taxpayer Relief Act86 will continue the 2 0 0 8 Farm Bill until
September 3 0 th, 2 0 1 3 87.

Covering All Bases: Other Areas of US Government Expenditures in Farm
Subsidization
Through decades of legislation, the US Federal Government covers virtually
every angle of the farming industry. The basics for staying competitive that most
industries in America m ust fund themselves are heavily covered and historically
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funded more and more by federal funds. These areas include insurance, disaster aid,
exports, and research.
Crop insurance program s have been growing significantly over the decades.
The rationale is th at it “reduces farmers' dependence on emergency bailouts”88.
While insurance is a practical entity of any industry, the federal government's
coddling of the food industry has created a living moral hazard. Congress is rapid
when declaring states of emergencies for even relatively minor crop damage. Many
farm ers receive two paym ents when “emergencies” strike: one from their
subsidized insurance plan and a second time from federal disaster relief funds89.
With the intention of being able to reduce as-needed disaster-relief, the 2 0 0 8
insurance expansion im plemented a perm anent disaster program. Crops th at don't
fall under the umbrella of insurance subsidization, Christmas trees, mushrooms,
ginseng, and tu rf grasses90 now have their own perm anent disaster coverage,
courtesy of the federal governm ent Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program 91.
The constant attention to the “security” of the food industry reduces incentives for it
to seek its own protection or play by the m arket rules.
In addition, the federal governm ent pays the tab for approximately $3 billion
dollars annually for USDA research92, $200 million for a range of activities under the
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Market Access Program for agricultural producers, including advertising
campaigns93, and the Foreign Market Development Program, with an approximate
annual spending of $35 million94. While governm ent is commonly looked to for
research and developm ent costs, the intensity of involvement in agricultural
m arketing shows just the tip of the depth of the trench the governm ent and the
industry are in together.

93 USDA Fact Sheets
94 Edwards
28

III. C o r n as K i n g , F o o d as F u e l : T h e B i o f u e l
D il e m m a
Since 1933, corn has been one of the prim ary foci of the US governm ent to
ensure the security of the food industry. More and more, the emphasis has been on
corn as a feed grain. Corn has become king in the United States, and consequentially
globally. The US is the current prim ary “producer and exporter of corn grain”95. As
of September 2010, eighty million acres of US farming land are dedicated to corn,
with tw enty percent of crop yield being exported96. In recent years, the use of corn
has exploded; it's not simply a product for human consumption, but for feeding
livestock, biofuels, plastics, adhesives, and even medicinal uses97.
Between 1 9 9 5 and 2005, $37 billion US dollars w ent to corn subsidization98.
The United States was not alone on the tren d 99, although it was 44.5% of the m arket
in 2 0 0 5 100. Brazil began producing 45.2% of global biodiesel output from sugar cane
and other parts of the world, particularly Europe, produced it from oil seeds101.

95 Simmons, Kay. "A Systems Approach to Corn." Agricultural Research 58.8 (2010):
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Projected EU rapeseed and US corn-maize biofuel production is to skyrocket in
production over the next ten years102.
One of the m ost interesting developments in subsidization of food in the
United States has been biofuels. Corn ethanol first appeared in 1974, just after the
first oil shock, with a country ready to be rid of energy dependence. Scientists were
able to take corn and turn it into a working fuel. The possibilities were endless, and
the idea was loved by business, farmers, voters, environmental watchdogs, and
politicians alike. It could be the future of renewable energy, and the US would have
the capability to mass produce it. There were steps in Congress to aid the industry,
as a replacem ent for the lead being phased out of gasoline, which was to be replaced
by ethanol103. This trend continued rapidly, especially into the early 2 0 0 0 s as new
oil price spikes and a renew ed determ ination to cut oil im port dependencies on
OPEC nations were reinforced by 9 /1 1 and other international tensions. Both sides
of the aisle saw biofuels as the darling, of legislation and source of Midwest votes.
Legislation enacted in 2 0 0 5 made biofuels look like a savior yet again.
Encouraging domestic creation and use of ethanol, the US governm ent provided a
US$0.51 cent tax credit for ethanol-petrol users, and a trade tariff of US$0.54 cents

102 “2011 W orld Food Report”. Food and Agriculture Organization o f the United Nations.
Banerjee, Arindam. "Food, Feed, Fuel: Transforming the Competition for
Grains."Development and Change; The Institute o f Social Studies, the Hague 42.2
(2011): 529-55. Print.
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on any and all im ported ethanol104. To make m atters even sw eeter for corn
producers, many states have their own layer of subsidization for the production and
use of corn ethanol105.
Expanding EPA standards for increasing gas mileage and decreasing
emissions for new cars also made biofuels incredibly attractive. This was increased
even more when methyl-t-butyl (MTBE), a chemical additive in gasoline to help
m eet emissions standards, was determ ined to be a “health risk” and removal of it
from the m arket gradually began106. That m eant 7.5 billion liters107 of product
needed to be replaced, and biofuels looked to be logical filler. While biofuels can be
produced from a num ber of substances, including also heavily grown soy, corn thus
far has rem ained king.
The three prim ary benefits asserted by pro-ethanol advocates are the
reduction of oil im portation, more farm revenue, and lower greenhouse emissions.
However, the impact of corn in the global marketplace has had far greater and far
more reaching effects in the highly interconnected, interdependent world market.
The nature of the systemic environm ent creates economic and environmental risks
associated with each of the prim ary goals.

104 Odling-Smee, Lucy,. "Biofuels Bandwagon Hits a Rut." Nature 446.7135
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With a food supply so dependent on corn, and the subsidization of it, there is
increasingly the potential for real competition betw een the food and fuel
industries108. In 2007, corn feed prices were double w hat they had been the year
before, partly because of the quick increase in demand for biofuels from both the
private and public sectors109. Food producers are not only battling the needs of
natural hum an consumption, both domestically and internationally, in a highly
populated world, but now are indirect competition with energy as well110.
This competition invariably leads to the cost shift to the consumers,
especially in the third-w orld111, where slight food price increases have far deeper
and far more reaching consequences than in the global north. The bottom
percentages of income globally spend 5 0 -8 0 % 112 of total household income on food.
Any price spike can lead to not being able to eat or afford healthcare and education.
Consequently, m alnutrition-related diseases can increase, potentially leading to
more instability and a more aggravated population.
At the same time, production of w heat and rice has been much lower due to
the profitability of biofuels. In 2000, approximately five percent of the total corn
yield was being used for biofuels. By 2007, th at num ber was tw enty percent113. The
land needed for corn production increased, decreasing production of w heat and rice.
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This problem is compounded even further given th at w heat and rice are more and
more often used for ethanol production as well. The Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2 0 0 7 114 called for the total renewable fuel standard to be 36 billion
gallons, with 1 billion gallons being biodiesel, by 2022.
The hope and belief in biofuels quickly turned into a variety of consequences
tougher for investors. Capital costs for plants, due to shortages, have increased
approximately 80% , as of July 2 0 0 8 115. Engineers were harder and more expensive
to hire, the price of corn began a steep upward climb, as did the m achinery116
needed to produce and keep up with growing demand. There are significant
advantages to investing in biofuels, but it's a future's m arket that depends heavily
on subsidization, dependable legislation, and natural production.
Biofuels have a major efficiency problem: they were, and are, heavily
produced and subsidized in a highly political environm ent of high oil prices. The
price of biofuels became its own monster, dependent on the price of oil. If oil prices
decline, ethanol loses its profitability117. Ethanol production is driven by the m arket
scarcity of oil, b u t the price of oil isn't only due to the free marketplace, either118.
The delicate balance between oil, corn prices, and ethanol production is driven
prim arily by the government. Instead of the m arket generating ethanol production,
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it is driven by a few companies, their lobbyists, and the government. In a normal
m arket situation, the bubble for biofuels would have already burst, unless new
technology quickly developed. However, direct governm ent support, especially in
the U.S., ensured their presence and continued support.
Incentives rem ain readily available and highly attractive to the farming
sector. In 2007, there was a $0.51 per gallon tax credit available for ethanol
producers. Smaller quantity producers would receive an additional ten-cent per
gallon tax reduction for their first 15 million gallons produced119. Biofuels, also
protected by tariffs, circulate in an essentially competition-free market. In these
terms, the consumer will lose. Considering how far reaching corn is throughout the
US market, the consumer has the potential to lose far more than can ever be truly
predicted, be it at the pump, the grocery store, or deficit-spending induced inflation
and eventual decline of purchasing power.
The conundrum has become keeping production levels high enough to
produce the ethanol to run the factories that create the ethanol while keeping food
supply high enough. If biofuels are more subsidized, the price of corn skyrockets, as
has been seen, and the need for proportional payments would decline. The
aggregate government spending for corn, however, would still increase, due to the
greater am ount of acreage dedicated to corn production. In 2 0 0 7 alone, corn
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acreage jum ped from 78 million to 92 million acres120, directly due to higher corn
prices because of the dramatic increase in corn ethanol production. In the political
game of today, corn subsidy removal is a task few, if any, in Washington are willing
to take on.
The bigger problem facing biofuel production is th at it is unlikely to be
enough to be a true “solution” many believed it could be. If all the possible farmland
in the world were used to grow high-yield crops for biofuels, only 20% of current
energy demand would be satisfied121. This is partly due to lagging technology and
inefficiencies, and partly due to the ideological pipe dream from politicians,
environmentalists, producers, and voters. OECD studies show that it would take
70% of Europe's farmland growing for biofuels to barely reach 10% of
transportation fuel dem and122.
There are plenty of other materials th at would be useful, and better, for
ethanol production than corn, like grass and woodchips123; but the research and
developm ent along with the crucial lobbying aren't there like they have been for
corn. This is partially due to the dynamics of reactionary democracies, particularly
in the U.S. electoral system. Party polarization, ram pant across the country, and
presidential elections coming down to a few swing states, create an environment
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perfect for pork-barreling on all levels of government. Iowa124, as a swing state, and
a major corn producer, has benefited greatly from its electoral sway. Keeping the
present system is an easy political sell to keep Iowa happy and producing for both
sides of the aisle.
The subsidization of corn ethanol production would probably be an easier
pill to swallow if it w asn't a blatant form of corporate welfare and the squashing of
competition. Archer Daniels Midland Company, thanks to significant lobbying
efforts, is the largest producer of ethanol in the US125. Starting as a small factor in
the market, by 1980 it was a major player in corn due to the dramatic increase in the
use of corn syrup. By 2 0 0 6 ADM produced the m ost ethanol in the US, four times
more than the second largest producer126.
The sheer am ount of governm ent demands for higher production, coupled
with the federal checkbook, has had plenty of companies attem pting to jump into
the game; the result is higher capital costs. The third player, aside from the
government and big corn producers, in the growing demand for biofuels has been
the environmentalists pushing for alternative energy sources. Many investors,
producers, politicians, and environmentalists are still willing to take the risk despite
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the negatives th at have surfaced127. The difference between many new-fuel
advocates in the past and today is th at they are throw ing their own money, by the
millions, into new ethanol companies128. Their investm ent essentially ensures their
support for more governm ent support, and therefore less likely to shift support to
more viable options that could develop in the future.
The end result of the biofuel subsidization epidemic has already created
consequences reaching far outside of the United States. Again, the price of biofuels
and oil is inextricably linked in current markets. Countries in the developing world
which are also oil im porters will be the hardest hit by skyrocketing of food prices129.
Mexico City, in 2007, am idst high corn prices, saw severe rioting over increased
prices. The main food consumption, especially for their large, impoverished class, is
tortillas, a corn based product, logically skyrocketed in price, nearly doubling, as
corn w ent up130.
The first generation of biofuels, still m ost predom inantly used, is the m ost
inefficient. There is promise with the next generations, but they are still in
developmental stages. In addition, the United States has been criticized for their
corn-ethanol because of the high emissions th at come from the manufacturing
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mechanisms along with the destruction of land131. The environmental damage of
first-generation biofuels, at current predicted production levels, is seemingly
unavoidable.
The more positively prom oted and subsidized biofuels become, the more
land th at will be deforested for growing soy, and especially corn for ethanol
production, therefore creating more carbon dioxide. Soy is an incredibly profitable
product to grow, and any void in the m arket would m ost likely lead to greater
production elsewhere to fill the m arket demand, especially in South America132.
Land and resources th at may be needed in the future is being used now to fill the
desire of governm ent to accomplish two outcomes: publicly respond to
environmental issues and please the corn industry.
Biofuels in the end could counter-act the very premise of their creation. The
International Food Policy Research Institute, in August 2010, estimated th at the end
carbon-emission impact, direct and indirect, would be greater due to biofuel usage
than current petrol consumption. They describe the benefits as “ambiguous” and
highly dependent on “param eters governing land use change”133.
Land use changes, taking natural land and converting it to crop-growing land,
is the area of biofuels with significant carbon-emission impact. Specifically in the
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U.S., corn and soy typically were on an alternating growing schedule, since soy adds
nitrogen, which is necessary for corn grow th134. However, because of the enticing
nature of corn, the rotation isn't occurring, and more nitrogen-based fertilizer is
being used. This leads to a greater runoff problem than already existed135.
Further, carbon caps in OECD countries can lead indirectly to the increase in
carbon-emissions in other countries136. Exporting carbon-emissions still leads to a
negative aggregate of higher carbon emissions. Current methods of production of
corn ethanol creates three elements: ethanol, distillers dried grains with soluble
(DDGS) (used as animal feed), and carbon dioxide, approximately one third each.
Prices in DDGS were a tug of w ar betw een soy and corn prices, but recent years have
seen corn become the far more dominant determ inant in prices.
Another major factor th at has been a big attributor to governm ent support
and funding of biofuels is the way energy costs and uses are calculated. Many of the
statistics don't include animal feed or carbon dioxide gas137. The total energy costs,
i.e. a “cradle to grave” calculation138, the “off-set” pieces of the calculation are a
significant factor in determ ining the true ability of biofuels to reduce carbon
em issions139.
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The transportation of ethanol and biofuels is another nightmare, in cost and
environmental impact. Biofuels, especially ethanol, cannot be transported by the
existing pipeline infrastructure. Instead of being able to ship biofuels directly to the
processing markets, blending in to the refined gasoline, ethanol and ethanol blends
m ust be transported through truck, rail, and barge140, all of which have significant
fuel cost141. The deluge of increased production, and consequently demand, has
already been causing problems for the transport industry, adding a further
limitation of ethanol.
The 2 0 1 1 G20 sum m it142 explicitly had biofuels as a p art of the discussion of
food security issues. They especially focused on biofuels in relation effects on food
prices and encouraging adjustm ents to domestic policy m andating increased
production of biofuels in relation to food supply. However, the summ it was careful
to not explicitly emphasize the links between biofuels and increased food prices, due
to the heavy producers of biofuels, i.e. Brazil, and heavy food im porters sensitive to
global food prices, i.e. China, in attendance143. The discussion also revolved around
internal policies, including US and EU tariff protectionist policies against im porters
of ethanol.
Brazil actually became a net im porter of biofuels from the US in 2011. Due to
the combination of consistently increasing output from US producers, backed by
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governm ent initiative, and the flexibility of Brazilians plants to craft sugar cane for
food or for biofuels, compounded with increased sugar demand in India, the biofuel
m arket became much less competitive in 2011. Although China in 2 0 0 1 had
intensively started to bolster ethanol production, with four state-owned plants in
operation, the rising of domestic grain prices caused them to quickly slow
production. In 2007, China was the third-largest net biofuel producer in the world,
b ut production had been slowed by governm ent policy capping the am ount of cereal
“feed grains” th at could be designated for biofuel production144.
Environmental impact was the second major topic discussed in relation to
biofuel production, tied in with farm-land use especially. The EU and US lead the
way being the largest consumers and producers of biodiesel, but the rising
environmental costs tied in with food price increases set up future debates and
policy to be framed at least partly around environmental issues145. If not the
sometimes unpopular environmental concerns, the debate comes down to the
question of energy-efficiency and how much is truly garnered for all the effort and
money spent on biofuel production and distribution.
While biofuels are not discredited internationally; there has been a call for
more sustainable practices and greater attention to new technology. This was
introduced through calls for on more specific guidelines on carbon-emission
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comparison to other fuel sources. For example, there was a committee established
focused on creating a certification process similar to th at of “fair-trade coffee”,
intent on reducing the “carbon intensity of biofuels”146.
The findings of the 2 0 1 1 Global Food Report conclude th at if prices continue
to increase in 2 0 1 2 as they did in 2011, US biofuel producers will have significant
profit increases; but livestock producers will have significant feed-grain price
increases to match. In order for feed-grain prices not to rise, ethanol made from
second-generation products, e.g. switch grass147, may be a way to ameliorate, but
not solve, price increases.
Biofuels have the potential to be a viable p art of the future of energy.
However, the bold moves by governm ent to subsidize w ithout fully understanding
long-term consequences have made biofuels unattractive at the systemic level, and
in many ways a m irror image of food policy in the United States. The pervasive
attitude of technology as a savior shines bright in the legislation and sponsored by
conglomerate producers.
However, until biofuels are a p art of the normalized, competitive,
marketplace, they are economically unviable. The dramatic increase in US role in the
biofuels market, especially with other countries opting out for various reasons,
could very well be said to have been an intended, direct consequence of US policy. In
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the United States, the intense focus on output, with biofuel production significantly
up, takes away from the focus on energy and food policy. Creating another
essentially state-run system to compete with the heavily state influenced food
industry clearly isn't the end solution, and isn't promising in long-term, nor the
short-run either.
The connection between food, oil, and land use create a complex netw ork of
subsidization and interdependencies th at ultimately hurt consumers everywhere,
b ut especially in the developing world. If ethanol production were left to the market,
it's possible th at the technology could be better, since it wouldn't be tied to
prim arily to corn with so much of its weight, and the other viable options, even new
ones, could have a chance.
It is notew orthy th at biofuels were present in two major sections of the
American Taxpayer Relief Act, Energy and Agriculture. Funding is continuing and
expanding to include research for cellulosic biofuels, produced from lignocellulose, a
major com ponent in m ost plants. This means more funding for switch grass and
woodchips. However, corn was still the big w inner with the continuation of their
major tax credits. The fact th at governm ent research money seems to be neverending for biofuel production leaves little motivation for the private sector to be
working on anything but subsidized sources of energy. The moral hazard that
companies will continue to w ork on inefficient, at least in the long run, energy
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sources instead of real innovation and m arket-based solutions is a potential
negative consequence for taxpayers and global citizens.
Clearly, these products have a lot of potential, but governm ent intervention
in clean energy hasn't proven to be generally successful in the United States.
Projects such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 1 6 0 3 148, that
invested in various forms of clean energy, has turned up many failed projects,
mostly extensions of corporate welfare, encouraging the status-quo.
As prudent as the idea is to keep searching for new sources of ethanol, with
food and w ater being put in jeopardy, and a lot of petroleum going into the
production and distribution of these products, it's time to reevaluate the role of
government. There is a lot of money to be made in developing the next big source of
energy, but as long as the government is dictating who and what will be the winner,
the results are unlikely to be positive outcomes.

148 Sullivan, Molly A. "1603: Corporate Welfare by Another Name." Web log post. Energy Policy
Center. Independence Institute, 27 Apr. 2012. Web.
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IV. G e n e t i c a l l y m o d i f i e d / e n g i n e e r e d f o o d :
Ev o l u t io n , R e g u l a t io n , and Co n tro l
Genetically Modified Foods: All the best intentions
Genetic changes in food are a p art of evolution. Natural changes and hybrids
of plants, both naturally and through careful seed selection by farmers, have been
occurring since the beginning of time, but with the discovery of DNA, there was new
opportunity for humans to be able to modify organism s149. Agriculture hooked on to
this new technology- seeing it as a way to lower the need for pesticides, increase
yields, and increase the quality of food on the superm arket shelf. The modifications
could be done with unbelievable speed, and with specific intentions playing out in a
single generation.
Three of the m ost popular ways historically to modify food are radiation
breeding, embryo rescue, and transposon m utagenesis150. These m anners of
modification require no regulation or safety tests prior to their release on the
m arket151, due to their pervasive nature and general positive outcomes throughout

149 Wholers, Anton. "Regulating Genetically Modified Food." Politics and the Life Sciences29.2
(2010): 17-39. Print.
150 Harlander, Susan. "Safety Assessments and Public Concern for Genetically Modified Food
Products: The American View." Toxicologic Pathology 30.1 (2002): 132-34. Print.
151 Harlander 132
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history. True genetic engineering changes to food “allows for the transfer of a few
genes in a much more precise, controllable, and predictable m anner”152.
Immediate suspicions were raised, especially outside of the US, of the
potential crossing of a threshold: how much influence can man truly have over
nature w ithout causing great harm 153? With the ability for humans to genetically
engineer food came a shift from “natural hazards” to “manufactured hazards”154.
Repercussions now have a direct link to human causation. Biological engineers
believe that because the environment is so much more controlled than typical
genetic changes to food th at it is an inherently b etter mechanism, even though it
goes much more rigorous safety examinations.
GMO legislative fram ework was established in 1992, with precursors in the
19 9 0 legislation defining organic foods. Policy makers believed th at the potential
economic and social benefits outweighed the potential risks enough to push the
modified foods to the market. The USDA, EPA, and FDA were the agencies deemed
capable of controlling safety and adm inistration. Safety of GMO foods was based on
the “substantial equivalence” of food already in place155. To put a genetically
modified tom ato on the market, it would have to have the equivalent of a tomato,

152 Harlander 132
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nutritionally, by the level of toxins, and allergens156. All GMO products on the m arket
have been determ ined to not be “inherently less safe” than non-modified
counterparts157.
The policy differences betw een the European Union and the United States
can be partly attributed to the general stances on technology, with the US being the
far more accepting. Policy makers in the US looked at the cost-benefit analysis of
GMO products158, seeing the high-yield possibilities and more food on the m arket as
better for consumers. In the EU, on the other hand, precaution reigns suprem e159,
typical of their tendency to lean on history and problems that have occurred in the
past. For the EU, there simply isn't enough data th at the food is the equivalent to
allow it to be largely available to the public.
The idea th at technology is a savior, and would develop quickly enough to
truly solve pressing domestic and global issues, entered the US food m arket fairly
easily. The possibility of technology solving the problems of food quality and
quantity was a satisfying thought and could be really im portant reality once GMO
foods became readily available.
The core of the differences between US and EU policy are two prim ary safety
concerns: allergens and toxins160. There isn't significant correlation, currently, to
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real risk in humans to w arrant their complete dismissal. Part of the issue of research
is how little time GMO products have really been dom inant in the market. Their
ascent was unbelievably quick, but the full effects of a life eating primarily GMO
foodstuffs can't truly be understood or declared until those born around 199 5 up to
the present are well into their adult lives. There hasn't been exposure long enough
to secure hard evidence about how GMO foods affect humans.
The problem with regulation of GMO and determ ining policy is th at we
simply don't know the long-term effects. W hat the impact will be on biodiversity
and the systemic ecosystems could be positive (not likely according to m ost
academics), could be negative, or anything in between or more extreme. The general
consensus is th at the reduction of biodiversity could have major consequences, from
single crops being wiped out completely to the developm ent of superbugs from crop
modifications that could transfer to hum ans161.
2 0 0 6 saw spiking of intermingling of GMO and non-GMO crops. Illegal
planting in Mexico and Japan especially of GMO crops have seen worldwide spread
of GMO crops to places like the UK, France, and Germany who have specific bans on
the products162.

Regulation: Keeping up with the Times

161 Falkner, Robert. "The Global Biotech Food Fight." The Brown Journal o f WorldAfairsXVI.1
(2007): 99-110.
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The debate about the safety of genetically engineering crops dates back to
the 1970s, when rDNA technology, the connection between two different pieces of
DNA, was discovered in 1 9 7 3 163. The potential for solutions and possible problems
was immediately recognized, so much so th at the US National Institutes of Health
(NIH) created an advisory committee to oversee and regulate the technology. The
USDA, EPA, and FDA quickly followed with their own regulations164. Once the idea of
engineering crops came into play, there was serious consideration in the United
States and abroad about various environmental, health, and potential regulatory
issues brought into the discussion165.
The OECD was the first to define biotechnology in 1982, and by 1983 NIH
had released their risk assessm ent plan166. The first bioengineered product released
into the environment was ice-minus bacterium 167, bacteria reducing the frost on
plants, the potential for crops to be able to withstand non-optimal weather. There
w ere studies published in 1983 about engineered tobacco, and the future super
GMO seed producer, Monsanto, had engineered petunias to have resistance to
kanamycin168, an antibiotic, as a “m arker” of the engineering, w ithout real purpose.

163 McHughen, Alan, and Stuart Smyth. "US Regulatory System For Genetically Modified
[Genetically Modified Organism (GMO), Rdna Or Transgenic] Crop Cultivars." Plant
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This is p art of the concern of antibiotic resistance in plants and livestock
transferring to humans, creating superbugs we are incapable of curing169.
The sheer speed in which the developments were occurring demanded
equally firm companion policy for governm ent to remain prevalent and effective.
The White House established committee, Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP), recom m ended th at the new technology be regulated primarily by the
finished product, not by the process to make them, because they believed rDNA was
not a significant risk by itself170.
The USDA, EPA, and FDA were each given specific monitoring tasks, all
looking out for risk factors. The USDA was to take the lead on ensuring GMO
agriculture didn't harm the rest of the sector, FDA regulating the potential th reat to
feed and food supply, and the EPA to evaluate products modified as pesticides171.
The divide-and-conquer method of approaching GMO products was well received.
Scientific panels had consensus on three basic principles: modification can lead the
way to hazard, both by human engineering and traditional breeding, biotechnology
isn't more of a th reat than the traditional m anners of breeding, and th at risk
evaluation should be focused on the finished, m arketed product172.
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Bringing a newly bred crop to the m arket isn't a complex process in the US.
The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1 9 9 4 173 allows cultivators th at can produce a
“genetically stable genotype”174 over several generations, taking into account soil,
yield potential, and reaction to current relevant diseases, the product will probably
be able to make it to the market. As long as the plant isn't a “noxious w eed” or
interfering with general biosafety (the two overarching ways to get rejected),
genetically engineered food perm its are attainable. After it was discovered, and
publically broadcast, th at there were blatant field trials w ithout perm its in 2003, the
Animal Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) strengthened the regulations, with
larger buffer zones around trials and longer trial periods.
Deregulation of the system began in 1992, where plants deemed benign
environmentally could be released commercially175. In 1993, Flavr Savr, the
modification th at keeps tom atoes ripe, a viral disease-resistant squash, GE cotton,
and a GE soybean from Monsanto were the first GMO products placed on the non
regulated status list. By 2006, 100 genetically engineered products had made the
non-regulated list.

Defining "organic" in the new biotechnology food world
Mostly due to the pervasive nature of GMO foodstuffs in the market, there are
m isunderstandings in the mass public and huge scientific problems identifying
173 McHughen 2
174 McHughen 3
175 McHughen 6
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GMOs, their consequences, and exactly how “organic” or “modified” a product is176.
Consumers th at prefer to buy organic generally would describe organic food very
ambiguously, such as “b etter for you” or “doesn't have chemicals”177. The typical
organic purchaser buys thinking of themselves and their family, unaware of the
greater policy and global effects at play178.
The majority of “organic” food purchased by consumers in the US is not from
mom and pop style farms. They are actually from subsidiary productions of the
conglomerate agricultural producers179, the same companies stocking the nonorganic section at your local grocery chain. This stems from two realities facing
farming today180. First of all, it's usually p art of a large operation, looking for a boost
in sales by dedicating a portion of their large farming area to organic production,
with no intention of adapting the process as a whole. The second reality is th at m ost
farmland is rented. When farmland is rented, there isn't a big personal push to
retain soil and practice sustainably.
The pervasive nature of GMO food in the US is staggering; as of 2010, the
total num ber of genetically modified corn, cotton, and soy on the m arket totals 90% .
Corn is at 86% genetically modified181, soy and cotton are both at 93% . The

176 Chrzan, Janet. "The American Omnivore's Dilemma: Who Constructs “Organic” Food?" Food
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difficulty in distinguishing GMO and organic food begins here: when 90 percent of
corn is genetically modified, all the potential by-products are therefore modified as
well. Common corn derivatives used in processed food are corn oil, cornstarch, corn
flour, cornmeal, dextrose, and the ever-popular high-fructose corn syrup182, all a
family of high volume presence on the shelf. Establishing a chain-of-custody for
corn based derivatives in processed foods becomes incredibly difficult, especially
when considering that corn products will change hands an estim ated 14-17 times,
ending with an estim ated 70% -80% of processed foods having GMO products183.
Since labeling of GMO food is a voluntary process, and producers willing to
go through a labeling process are typically those not genetically modifying their
food, it's a demanding process to establish that all products in the distribution chain
can remain pure of modified products and by-products. Natural cross-pollination of
genetically modified seeds and non-GMO seeds is virtually unavoidable184. Because
of this, non-GMO labels typically mean th at there will be a presence of genetically
modified food, but only up to a certain threshold set by the producer. The bigger
problem than attaining certification in the movement of products is the testing for
GMO products. The technology isn't great, with many resulting in false positives and
negatives when testing for GMO presence. A 2 0 0 1 study showed th at 16 of 20 tested
items labeled non-GMO had, in fact contained GMOs.
Compass, 30 June 2010. Web.
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The cost of testing, and lack of accuracy across the board, is quickly passed
on to the consumer. Since the conception of GMO food products in the marketplace,
the FDA has made it clear th at foods th at are not “materially different”185 from their
“natural” counterpart do not require labeling. The FDA believes th at labeling nonGMO products would inherently be misleading, especially if there are no other
versions of th at food th at are bio-engineered and due to the non-trustw orthy nature
of current testing m echanisms186. Regardless, companies are labeling products, even
in light of the odds th at the food has been GMO “contam inated” are very high.
The nature of creating non-GMO food products in the United States is tenfold
more difficult given how the food industry has been riding the wave of GMO foods.
Companies generally do not have the separate storage capabilities (o r desire to do
so) due to the fluctuation and hard-to-predict nature of the non-GMO food
m arket187.

Inefficiencies and Deficiencies: How the subsidized structure picking corn as
king made the consumer the loser
Looking at the m ost basic elem ent of food subsidization in the US, money, it's
clear th at staple crops like wheat, soybeans, and particularly corn, are the big
winners. Inherently, there is less acreage, and less incentive to grow fruits and
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vegetables188. In the general superm arket setting, excluding the extreme so-called
“food deserts” in urban settings with low access to fresh fruits and vegetables, most
of this disparity is made up for through imports, especially from Mexico.
Corn is used heavily in many, if not m ost of the types of additives th at make
food easiest to sell, by making them taste good. With corn so subsidized, and so
prevalent, of course it's used heavily in feeding livestock and for these additives. The
price gap betw een high-sugar and high-fat foods, with many corn and soy
derivatives, makes a theoretical case th at Agricultural policy in the US can be
considered a contributing factor to rising obesity189. Obesity is heavily associated
with poverty190. The fat foods are cheaper, and poor people eat the cheaper, heavier
fat content foods. Obviously, there are many other factors associated, but the simple
costs of healthy versus heavily processed, corn-likened foods isn't a factor to be
dismissed.
Soft drinks rely heavily on the corn-starch-derived sweetener, high fructose
corn syrup (HFCS). Europe escaped this trend because they traditionally used beet
sugar for sweeteners, and created legislation promoting beet sugar to protect their
farm ers191. Instead of the traditional cane sugar being used, this synthetic sw eetener
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use jumped 10 0 0% in use betw een 1970 and 1 9 9 0 192. 4 0% of all sw eeteners (not
non-calorie versions) in the US are based on HFCS193.
Although the research is still just correlative and not universally accepted,
there are many in the scientific community questioning if HFCS, since it is synthetic,
and tastes sweeter, than traditional sugar, could be an underlying cause of obesity in
the US, due to an inability of the body to process the synthetic m aterials194. Would
this product have reached the US m arket had it not been for substantial corn
subsidization? Probably. The difference is, it may not have become the m ost
prevalent. If corn w asn't chosen as king and other sw eeteners could have still been
active on the market.
The prim ary way in which the public loses, however, isn't necessarily in the
quality of product itself, but in how little choice the consumer is given. Due to the
ease of corporations being able to pump their modified products into the market,
w ithout any form of labeling, average consumers truly have no way of knowing
w hat is in their food. The faith th at because a food is “substantially equivalent” to its
non-engineered counterpart, and th at it w on't have potential long-term
consequences, is a serious gamble; and one th at people should deliberately have the
option to decide for themselves.

192 Fields 823
193 Fields 823
194 Fields 823

56

V. C o n g l o m e r a t e c o n t r o l , G o v e r n m e n t A l l o w a n c e
Government: The Trust and the Trust-Buster
The U.S. federal governm ent has created a strong connection over the last
eighty plus years with the food industry. Food is treated as a m atter of national
security, and the industry is coddled in every facet financially and legally. Now that
the food industrial machine is bigger than even Secretary Earl Butz could have
imagined, is it possible to break the dependency? Trust laws are complicated with
decades of standing legislation supporting conglomerates and mass production.
Consumers are given an illusion of choice when it's actually the same few producers
at every chain grocery store.

Archer Daniels Midland Corporation
Development
There are plenty of companies, especially conglomerates, taking fully
advantage of the heavily regulated and subsidized food m arket in the US, both
directly and indirectly. Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADMC) is one of the most
blatant examples. ADMC is known for throw ing money at both sides of the aisle, and
reaping the benefits in huge protections in the forms of tariffs and domestic
subsidization.
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ADM has managed to become one of the dom inant actors through its
lobbying efforts and commercialized, especially through TV ads, depiction of it as a
decent corporation. For subsidization of sugar or ethanol products, there is little
cost and effort for ADM195. Described as “one of the great financial ‘switch hitters' of
American politics”196, either side of the aisle th at will provide subsidization gets the
m onetary support. From 19 79 to 1995, form er chairman Dwayne Andreas, personal
family members, and ADM Corporation donated US$4 million dollars to both
congressional and presidential candidates and the Republican and Democratic
National Committees197.

Sugar
U.S. policy in regard to im port quotas and price supports induce conditions
th at ADM is able to produce high-fructose corn syrup in incredibly profitable
conditions198. ADM became a big player in the sugar industry in 1974, as world
sugar prices peaked199. After investm ent capital was put into development of HFCS
by ADM, the company was able to produce nine times more HFCS than with
previous technology. The price of sugar fell dramatically, from per-pound prices of
65 cents to 8 cents200. Paying politicians on the Democratic and Republican side,
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along with retaining a heavy portion of the prim ary lobbying force in sugar, The
American Sugar Alliance, paid off with the 19 81 sugar bill201.
Misleading advertisem ent to the public, alleging th at the US was home of the
cheapest sugar prices, which actually was a false statem ent, prom pted a domestic
debate on the subject. The idea was circulated widely in new spaper ads, and
allowed the passage of the Sugar Act w ithout much public outcry202. The program is
brilliantly designed to look as though it's not even a p art of the federal budget. A
quota system was established, effectively eliminating cheaper imports of sugar,
creating a constant, artificial sugar shortage in the US th at consumers pay for at the
checkout stand203.
When the 19 8 1 Sugar Bill was enacted, sugar sold for 22 cents per pound,
when the global price was approximately 4.5 cents per pound204. Defendants of the
program say th at it protects consumers from unpredictable global price fluxuations.
However, the price floor set by the government, w ithout a price celling, allows sugar
prices to skyrocket, but not fall205- an inherent win for companies like ADM but an
inherent loss for consumers' denial to open markets. The relative stability of sugar
prices, lacking major spikes, is simply because the price is already spiked up.
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Sugar, especially in the quantity now being produced in the US, isn't
economical. Importing sugar from countries with the natural climate for it takes up
land that could be b etter suited for growing other products. Excessive growing of
sugar in the Florida Everglades, which includes serious draining of w ater and the
subsequent high levels of chemicals needed to create the right growing
environment, has led to the destruction of much of the area206.
The effects on third-w orld nations, prim arily in South America, are
astronomical. From 1 9 7 5-1 9 95, sugar imports were cut by 8 0 % 207, seemingly great
for American producers. However, while the economies of Central America and the
Philippines (am ong others) were economically demolished, 17 of the United State's
largest sugar producers received over half of all governm ent subsidizations. No
competition and blatant corporate welfare cost American consumers $3 billion
dollars per American sugar producer from 1 9 8 0 -1 9 9 5 208.

Corn
In the late 1980s, then CEO Dwayne Andreas began to hail corn ethanol as a
savior, as a form of national security, both environmentally and dependency on
Middle Eastern oil. Continually supporting those th at supported ethanol production,
ADM was able to jump to the forefront, with gas tax-breaks and much R&D
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supported by the government, despite adam ant warnings th at corn ethanol had
dozens of potential environmental hazards and was cost-prohibitive.
ADM spent $1,700,000 and $9 70,000 in lobbying in 2 0 1 1 and 2012,
respectively. For the 2 0 1 2 election cycle, ADM put out $ 57 5,880 as a p art of their
investment. They spent on both sides of the isle, including heavy contributions to
both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. It appears that the election didn't even really
m atter, for they were so incredibly invested- everywhere. Their returns would be
safe regardless of future election outcomes. Thirteen of their fourteen lobbyists
previously worked in government, and seven members of congress own shares in
ADM. Everyone but the average consumer has a financial stake in their success;
subsidization and regulation fits their needs.
ADM used its governm ent influence back in the 1970s to support their own
interests. The 1973 declaration of Secretary Earl Butz to ensure food supply and
grow, grow, grow, and was heavily influenced by Andreas. Illegal money was heavily
flowing into the Nixon Administration, as came to light during the W atergate
investigation209. The money continued during Carter Administration, when Senator
Hubert Humphrey's chief of staff David Gartner's children received $72,000 in ADM

209 Krakoff, Charles. "Starvation, Obesity, and Corporate Welfare: Archer Daniels Midland and
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stock betw een 19 7 5 and 1 9 7 7 210. David Gartner was the head of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission until these “gifts” were discovered.
The money continued through campaign after campaign, and was especially
heavy for Bob Dole's presidential campaign. Although unsuccessful, Senator Dole
still held much weight in the senate, ensuring the lucrative $0.54 tax credit pergallon of ethanol was passed, critical since ADM produces 60% (2 0 1 0 ) of all US
produced ethanol.

Monsanto
History
Monsanto technically has been around since 1 9 0 1 211, although their focus
has shifted quite dramatically since the beginnings of the company. A chemical
company, whose first chemical was an artificial sweetener, continued to grow and
pushed into the agricultural chemical world in 1945. In 1960, the Agricultural
division of the company quickly started producing commercialized herbicides. Their
m ost famous, Roundup was on the m arket in 1976. Throughout the 1970s and
1980s, heavy research and development helped them create the first genetically
modified products, culminating in their 19 87 groundbreaking, first in the industry,
biotechnology field testing. The company continued to develop and patent seeds and

210 Krakoff
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agricultural chemicals, purchasing other chemical and biological research
companies along the way.
The 1990s were filled with insect-resistant research and m arket-ready
products. In 2000, Monsanto became a “new” company after their m erger with
Pharmacia Corporation. Through the present, the company continues to buy and sell
related companies. Monsanto is no longer a chemical company, but a producer of
agricultural goods and products th at help in the process. The progression into the
conglomerate they have become was a slow one, a legal one, and now a painful
reality of bad public policy, patent laws, and legal battles.
The true core of the problem with Monsanto, when the general population
doesn't clearly hear in many popular documentaries, is th at w hat they are doing is
completely legal. Some of their scare tactics, legal attem pts at pushing nonMonsanto seed farmers out of the business, are potentially illegal, and they have
received legal ramifications, but in the grand scheme of things, it's still the
governm ent th at is responsible at the end of the day.

The Seed and the Rules
The advances in technology and resulting products Monsanto has created are
alm ost incomprehensible. Although not a t the yield rates genetically modified foods
w ere anticipated to be, their advances in herbicides and pesticides successes are
partly due to the sheer am ount of food available globally.
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There are plenty of chemicals to kill bugs produced by other companies that
produced alongside Monsanto. The ability for Monsanto to manipulate the core of
living organisms so effectively elevated them to be a prim ary producer of
agricultural products. The Roundup Ready seeds, designed to be used with
Roundup, the herbicide th at controls a variety of unw anted plant species, are far
and away the m ost popular and successful. Monsanto claims using the products
together can clear “an entire field of weeds and still produce bountiful soybean and
cotton crops”212.
This “miracle”, however, comes with a very serious condition: the Monsanto
Technology/Stewardship Agreement. The primary, and m ost significantly litigated
p art of the agreement, is th at farmers may not practice seed saving. Naturally
manipulating generations of seeds allowed farm ers to be autonomous and
successful, b etter able to determ ine and plan for the following season's yields.

Patent Laws213
At their philosophical core, patent laws are designed to prom ote freeenterprise, to encourage new development, and to spur economic growth. They are
m eant to protect hard-earned research and the ability to sell the product w ithout
generic competition- at least for a time period, depending on the product.

212 Ma, Michelle. "Anticipating and Reducing the Unfairness of Monsanto's Inadvertent
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There are two crucial elements at odds with one another when it comes to
patenting seeds in the current context of Agriculture in the United States. First of all,
Monsanto puts its own capital into research and development, approximately $2.6
million dollars per day, making up 29.82% of all biotechnology industry R&D.
Considering that research from concept to m arket time frame ranges from six to
thirteen years per product, and th at the probability of successfully launching a
m arket product hovers at five percent, Monsanto takes serious risks. This frontloaded risk gives Monsanto a lot more pow er in the patent realm, fitting neatly into
the purpose of regulations on intellectual property. There m ust be a way to protect
this kind of investment, or technological advancements wouldn't happen.
In reality, seed patent laws, public policy, and Monsanto practices contradict
the core spirit of entrepreneurial patents. Intimidation tactics, a strong legal team,
and consistent court precedent have allowed Monsanto to virtually dominate the
market. Heavy investm ent and the heavily debated practice of patenting living
organisms create a delicate situation, and a potential floodgate of deeper levels of
bio-patents.
The Plant Patent Act of 1 93 0 (PPA), the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970
(PVPA), and the Patent Act, Title 3 5 214 are the key components to biological patent
laws. The PPA isn't useful for Monsanto, however, because it applies to asexually
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reproducing, primarily ornam ental (grown for beauty as its “end use”215). It is the
PPA and the Patent Act th at are the keys. The PVPA, although covering a rather
broad spectrum of patent rights and much easier to fall under its protection,
includes two critical exceptions: a purchased seed that a farm er saves future
generations of to be replanted, and for “bona fide research” purposes216. The Patent
Act has tougher requirem ents to fit under, but only three purposefully universal
exceptions to coverage: “abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenom enon”217.
For this reason, Monsanto, and similar corporations, lean on the Patent Act, and
completely within their legal right to do so.
Monsanto is capable of utilizing two types of patent infringem ent suits:
“purposeful infringem ent” and “inadvertent infringement”218. However, there is no
documentation of inadvertent infringement cases thus-far. It is acceptable, and
feared. The problem is nature can blow Monsanto seeds to people that haven't
purchased them. There is not an intent requirem ent in patent law, thus a person
could be in breach of a contract they didn't know they were a p art of, and legally
Monsanto can take action.
The maximum time for patent protection is tw enty years, in any case.
However, with seeds, it has been a constant trouble in the Federal Circuit to
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determ ine when Monsanto's “enforcem ent rights” are exhausted219 . Farmers have
consistently lost on this front, tying it in with anti-trust violations th at could negate
their patent rights. The two elements th at qualify for anti-trust in a contractual
purchase of a patented product are price fixes and creating another necessary
product th at would thus monopolize the market, a tie-in220. Since Monsanto has a
clear agreem ent upon purchase that prevents farmers from planting a secondgeneration seed, and recommends, not m andates Roundup be used with the
Roundup Ready seed for optimal growing, they are not violating anti-trust or patent
laws.

The Reality: A Dirty, Legal Game
If the agricultural industry were operating in a free-market, free-trade
environment, all of the patent and much of the anti-trust legislation would make
perfect sense. But the governm ent wanting more and more planted, regardless of
natural stipulation, has led to one type of seed virtually taking over. Genetically
modified seeds are m eant to be resistant and stronger than natural seeds, thus
making it much easier for them to become even more dominant, w ithout any other
interference221. But it is im prudent to let Monsanto have a guaranteed continued
market, especially with corn. Legislation, especially biofuels, pushes for more corn;
Monsanto pushes more seeds.
219 Ma 705
220 Ma 706
221 Ma 705
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Monsanto has spent $5,970,000 on lobbying since 1998. Campaign
contributions of $90 8,0 17 were provided for the 2 0 1 2 election alone. The real
power is in the placem ent of very im portant people; in many im portant public
positions, who also worked for Monsanto222. Many persons in the White House,
especially in the m ost critical to genetically modified products continuing in the
market, w ere previous Monsanto employees who have also become the people in
charge of approval processes. From President H.W. Bush to the current Obama
Administration, Monsanto people have been in very crucial positions.
Although adam ant in 2 0 0 7 while campaigning th at agriculture wouldn't
continue to be controlled by conglomerate interests, President Obama's choices for
many im portant positions reflect precisely the opposite. Starting at the top, USDA
Secretary Tom Vilsack had been a vocally pro-biotechnology governor of Iowa, pure
corn country. The FDA Commissioner for Food? None other than former Monsanto
Vice President. Roger Beachy, former director of a plant research center, Monsantofunded of course, is currently the director of the USDA National Institute of Food
and Agriculture223. Part of his job is determ ining the areas of agricultural research
which should be federally funded. Put simply, from the bottom to the top, Monsanto
has managed to have their product dominating the market- in a mere tw enty years.
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"QMO Food Fight: Round Two 2013.” Organic Consumers Association: Millions Against
Monsanto.
"GMO Food Fight: Round Two 2013.”
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Conclusions
It's easy to point to corporations using both classic and incredibly
sophisticated techniques to get their product approved and increase shareholder
dividends. Popular food documentaries have pointed to the corporate world as the
prim ary source of food problems in both the United States and globally. The reality
of the problem is far more complex. The interconnectedness nature of the US
governm ent and food costs through regulations and funding is the true root of the
problem. With the governm ent and the food industry so mutually dependent on one
another, both believing they cannot survive w ithout the other, it's difficult to
pinpoint a single critical flaw betw een private industry and governm ent
intervention.
The depth and width of corporate welfare is far beyond w hat m ost people
would expect. Between campaigns, lobbying, judicial processes, and putting their
people in the government, these conglomerates act more like enabled drug cartels,
with legislators gladly dipping into the dope supply. Archer Daniels Midland and
Monsanto Corporation invested large amounts into the 2 0 1 1 -2 0 1 2 campaign cycles,
and saw their return with the continuation of heavy biofuel subsidization. Monsanto
breeds the seeds th at grow the corn and ADM produces the biofuels. The result is a
heavy loss for both consumers and taxpayers.
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On November 30 th, 20 1 0 224, a group of fifteen bi-partisan Senators rose
above party lines to support biofuel tax credits and tariff provisions. They were all
geographically relevant to corn, and all received PAC campaign contributions. On
the surface, this was in the interest of keeping taxpayer money from the “hands of
unstable or unfriendly governm ents” as well as the reduction of foreign dependency
on oil.
In addition, these Senators included “stability and certainty for producers
and consumers of renewable fuels” as the basis for continued support. Biofuels are
the easiest sell and the easiest way to ensure a lucrative relationship with the
conglomerates. The average gift received per election was five-thousand from
Monsanto, $4,100 from ADM, and $1,600 from the National Corn Growers
Association, each an average gift to each of these fifteen senators in the previous six
years. The exception was Sam Brownback who took no contributions (although was
also retiring to become governor of K ansas)225. The result has been higher food
prices, a step backward in renewable fuel, and continuing the incestuous
relationship.

224 Conrad, Kent, Christopher Bond, Chuck Grassley, Tom Harkin, Amy Klobuchlar, Sam
Brownback, Tim Johnson, Mike Johanns, Debbie Stabenow, Claire McCaskill, Ben
Nelson, John Thune, Byron Dorgan, Al Franken, and Mark Kirk. "Senate Biofuel
Support." Letter to Majority Leader Reid and Minority Leader McConnell. 30 Nov. 2010.
United States Senate, Washington, D.C.
225 Beckel, Michael. "Senators Supporting Ethanol Subsidies Reap Riches From Corn
Interests."OpenSecrets Blog. OpenSecrets, 3 Jan. 2011. Web.
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The problem is deep, with no simple solution. Corporations provide
seemingly cheap food, “renewable resources”, and keep legislators happy in a
tangled web of deceit, in which the both the consumer and the environm ent lose.
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V I. P r e d i c t i o n s f o r t h e F u t u r e o f t h e U S F o o d
Industry
Summary: The Broken Industry
The U.S. food industry is broken. Decades of governm ent intervention have
created dramatic dependencies from every angle, from production all the way to the
superm arket. Yet ironically, American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, provides no
relief from the status quo of elite decision makers. The depth of this mutual
dependence can be primarily traced back to the original piece of legislation, the
Agricultural Adjustm ent Act of 1933, which was designed to address an emergency
situation. This experim ent with Keynesian economics has continued, even as it has
created problems, including corporate welfare, modified foods, and balanced
budgets.
Food is, and has been, a major factor in national security. It also seems
unclear to policy makers th at it simply isn't 1933 anymore. In today's world, the
majority of farm families don't rely on farming as their prim ary source of income.
The subsidization they receive from their land, makes the average farm household
income actually significantly higher than the average U.S. household226.

226 Edwards
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If the world was the em bodim ent of classical liberalism, with free trade and
competition, the food industry wouldn't need any sort of financial support.
Shortages in some places, surpluses in others, combined with the efficiency of
transportation in the 2 1 st century would have created a global food m arket where
consumers had real options, reliable food sources, and efficient means of attaining
them. But the crops th at receive subsidization in the current state of affairs
inevitably become the cheapest on the shelves, and the m ost purchased, skewing the
advantages a free m arket could provide.
In the real world, free trade of foodstuffs is nonexistent. Many governments
provide a financial bubble for their food producers. They are told, at least in part,
what, where, and when to grow, provided insurance, tax breaks, and leniency, with
regulations and interpretations of constitutional rights from food safety to free
speech. Competition has been systematically eradicated within the US; this invites
nations to m irror restrictiveness through tariffs and stricter requirem ents for
m arket entry. The m ercantilist tendencies of many state governments, particularly
in the emerging economies, in the majority of their decisions and state-funded
projects have extended a giant hand to the food industry.
While the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been very adam ant about
discussing tariff and trade issues related to agriculture. But there always seems to
be some new “m arket access” negotiation th at results in countries being able to
pursue protectionist policies w ithout international scrutiny. A nation need not
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dem onstrate a “serious injury is being caused” in order to im plem ent said
policies227. Agriculture free-trade policies are a hypocritical given of the nature of
the market. Governments w ant to be involved, in essence violating free-market
values. Mercantilist nations have always, and will continue to manipulate their
currency as a p a rt of their agricultural and broader trade policies. It's not a simple
game of political assertion to change these dynamics, they are a reality to be dealt
with, not debated. Playing the pseudo-free-m arket game creates a zero-sum game
w here the consumer, and the aggregate economy, loses.
The “good” intentions of policy makers past in the US have created the harsh
reality of a monopolizing, vote-grabbing, lobbying, pork-barrel platter of debt and
health issues th at seems likely to rem ain in place. Taxpayer money is redistributednot to the small farmer, or the startup business, but to the conglomerate producers.
Between 1 9 9 5-2 0 03 , the average distribution of subsidy payments was 72% of the
total funds available going to the top 10 recipients228. These companies are more
than capable of insuring their own crops, buying new machinery, and determining
growing patterns. However, the handholding betw een the private and public sphere
runs so deep th at there is a clear concern even from the idea of separation.
The environmental impact the food industry has had in the last hundred or
so years has been partially unavoidable, a natural toll taken on the land to support
227 "WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION." Market Access: Special Agricultural Safeguards
(SSGs)
228 Edwards
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the jump in global population. The mechanisms for agriculture logically needed to
adapt, as chemicals were introduced and better, more efficient means of growing
grew alongside. Ecologically, the earth is quite capable of maintaining and healing
itself. However, if this pattern of continued wasteful practices continues, the earth
w on't be able to keep up, and the population will have a far more difficult time
sustaining itself. Government has been called upon to be the solution to these future
problems, even though many of the causes can be circled back to ineffective
legislation.
The US federal governm ent encouraged overproduction, overuse of land,
im proper land use, which was followed by increased use in pesticides and fertilizers
to make up for the dram atic decrease in viable topsoil. The m onetary incentives to
grow the top funding-receiving staple crops encourage many to particular crops are
inefficient or simply aren't suited to grow in th at area. Political clout takes
precedence over the natural consumer need.

State of the Global Food Industry: Outside Influences
The global nature of the current political economy is a factor th at can't be
ignored in regards to evaluating the future of global food policy. Economic changes
from many places around the world clearly effect systemic forecasts and current
m arket conditions, including commodity prices, like food. Few are willing to blindly
accept US proclamations of “free trade” food, especially seeing historically how it
actually plays out given th at the US m arket is incredibly manipulated. Emerging
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BRIC nations are willing to participate, but by their own rules of mercantilist,
protectionist policies.
2 0 1 2 was the perfect m aelstrom of events to create a precarious situation for
the global food market. One part was the dramatic drought and high tem peratures
th at wrecked North America in the summer. Corn truly is king in the US system, and
relying heavily on one crop did cause some shock through the system. Speculation
ran ram pant, with corn futures still looking bullish in early 2013. The combination
of increased global dem and for ethanol production (specifically corn-based in the
United States), high sum m er oil prices, and the speculation means that many more
will w ant to plant corn. Such potential m arket flooding will push out even more of
the few small producers left, and propel upward the cost of production. With the
increase in land used for corn production, there will inevitably also be shortages in
other staple crop areas, especially wheat, and food prices in the aggregate will be
driven up as well.
The pressures th at environment, government, and the global food industry
will face in food price increases and shortages will not help the economic situation
in the Global North. It will be more dramatic for the developing world, where so
much more of their income is devoted to buying food. Any increase can cause
dramatic changes in lifestyle for many families. This is compounded with the
growing tensions in some of the poorest parts of the world, and could escalate into
increased tensions and conflict. Non-diversified domestic markets, falling into the
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bullish times of certain crop production, will be hit a second time when the m arket
begins to wane and production is cost-prohibitive. The constant up and down puts
the world food m arket in even more uncertainty. Such conditions make it more
likely th at authoritarian ideas and leaders will make and emotional and appealing
case to the people impacted.

Food Demand, Limited Supplies
The unprecedented and intense world population growth has already
increased the problem of feeding the world population. With the technology and
environmental manipulation available, the possibilities seemed endless in the early
1990s. Not anticipated w ere the inefficiencies in the governm ent-m andated food
market. Growing where plants aren't supposed to, pesticides running into
freshw ater sources, and the hefty am ount of petro-chemicals and oil needed to get
products to the shelves have ensured the global food supply is as precarious as it
previously was, just with a lot of additives and compounded problems.
The technology for desalinization plants to make salt w ater drinkable has
always been seen as a future resource. However, at the moment freshw ater is a
commodity. It's a commodity th at isn't being used efficiently, and will quickly start
to cost dramatically more. On the other side of the equation, oil is expensive, and
probably w on't be significantly cheaper in the future.
Heavy oil-exporting countries will pull back the supply once the Keystone
Pipeline and more deep-w ater drilling come to fruition. There will still be the
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appearance of scarcity, and there will still be a significant cost factor. Allowing more
of the m arket to be involved in food production, essentially allowing competition to
have a chance is a necessary step in efficiency so desperately needed in the food
industry. Oil is a tough, also subsidy ridden, key to the global economy, of course
greatly effecting agricultural production. Although the problem of oil may not be
solved for a long time, allowing true competition to allocate resources will
inherently be more efficient than governm ent intervention.

Current Policies and the Future
Based on 2 0 1 2 national election results, it's clear th at deficit spending isn't
going away. The precarious situation of the early 2 0 1 3 Fiscal Cliff and inability of
representatives to make anything but last minute robberies of the American
people's futures makes it's clear the food industry will remain one of conglomerates.
The inability of the right to effectively evaluate military spending and the blatant
disregard for reality pretending to do business in monopoly money shows th at there
will have to be a rock bottom before any real change will be seen. The bottom will
consist of a Europe broken and financially crumbled, deadweight pension deficits in
the US, and a thriving combination of export and internal consuming BRIC nations
rising. At the current rate of threats from North Korea, the potential for a second
Cold War looms heavy in future predictions of the global balance of power.
Since the staple crops have evolved into highly traded futures' commodities,
speculation on food prices will grow. The clear need for more and more food will
78

make it a hot product in the global financial markets, kept stable only by constant
intervention by governments. At the current rate of investm ent and pressure for
more, I predict a food-futures bubble much like the 2 0 0 8 global financial meltdown.
The scale of this potential crisis would be impacted by droughts, oil prices,
availability of water, global tensions and control by conglomerates. The more these
futures are seen as reliable and lucrative, the more they have the potential to be
heavily bundled, as w ere mortgages, also federally backed, “safe” investments. The
volume of food produced both in the US and globally, is another reason food
commodities are deemed safe. With the increase in dem and for corn ethanol in the
US, it seems the bullish times will continue. However, the more futures markets are
depended on, the tougher the fall can be.
Assuming current Frank-Dodd legislation holds up, there will be much less
available capital in the m arket since banks must hold on to much more liquid
capital, protectionist policies and bailouts would provide another crushing blow to
the potential the free m arket could bring. The safety net of governm ent intervention
means another round of highly produced commodity crops, and more power to the
state-backed conglomerates to ensure food supply never runs out. If there are any
small producers left, they would easily be bought out during a finnancial food crisis
with limited capital availability for loans, the necessary capital to keep day-to-day,
or seasons of growing, viable.

Conclusion
79

Oil price increases, w ater becoming more expensive, inflation, and the
creation of virtual cartels of food will ensure prices keep going up in the
superm arket. The crux of the problem comes down to the intervention of
governm ent in such an enormous entity of the US economy. The massive am ount of
federal and state money available to the food industry, paired with the desire for a
conglomerate-style food industry in the 1970s perpetuated and deepened the core
problems with the food industry. The cornerstone of American food production isn't
competition, or m arket demand; it has instead become corporations and politicians
toeing the line of self-interested law.
Nutrition, our most basic need for subsistence, has been turned into a
bidding w ar between big companies, big commodities, and powerful legislators for
who gets to attain a larger share of the chemically-dependent public. The real
problem is not the simple “greed” of business or the lack of understanding of the
public; it's the unwise policies of the desperate, bid-seeking, elected representatives
and appointed officials. Food policy is broken. The governm ent not only perpetuates
it, clearly less concerned with the future than with instant gratification. This will not
be sustainable in the long run, and it certainly isn't w hat people would ultimately
choose for themselves, and their families, if individual rights were upheld.
The United States is known for its wonderful ability to appreciate and accept
new technology and the promises it can bring. While this still holds true,
governm ent invention in technology alongside botched Keynesian economic policy
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fundamentally altered w hat the food industry could have been. W ithout significant,
meaningful action to reduce government's role in agriculture in the next few
decades, the American people, and the global population will face great challenges in
our m ost basic need: for the agriculture to be reliable producers of sustenance.
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